

FUNCTIONAL SAFETY CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the

1750 Series Poppet Valve

manufactured by

Rotork Midland Ltd

Patrick Gregory Rd Wolverhampton West Midlands WV11 3DZ

UK

has been assessed by Sira Certification Service with reference to the CASS methodologies and found to meet the requirements of

IEC61508-1:2010 (Clause 6) IEC 61508-2:2010

The Product and its associated data contained herein can be considered for use in the design of safety functions up to and including

SIL 3*

when used in accordance with the scope and conditions of this certificate.

* The Product that has been certified is not implicit of the achieved Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of the safety related system

winas

Certification Manager:

W Thomas

Initial Certification:06/01/2012This certificate issued:16/02/2017Renewal date:15/02/2022

This certificate may only be reproduced in its entirety, without any change.



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Product description and scope of certification

The 1750 Series of 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valves are a range of compact poppet valves in stainless steel for use on gases and liquids.



^[1] These are new parameters used in IEC61508 Part 2 Sections 7.4.2 & 7.4.4.

^[2] This is a new measurable scale for the systematic safety integrity level; refer to IEC61508 Part 4 Section 3.5.9.

^[3] This is determined by the lowest SIL indicated by each of the parameters given above. ^[4] These figures are used only for demonstration purposes.



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(³ / ₄ " – 2") 1750 Series 3/2 sing	gle pilot spring	return poppet valve	
	Safety Function	<u>1:</u>	
'To ensure the Valve returns to a spring extended position when de-energized'			
	Type A Proof Test Interval =8760Hrs ^[4]		211.2
Architectural constraints:	HFT=0	$MTTR = 8 Hrs^{[4]}$	SILS
	SFF 98.25%		
	$\lambda_{DD} = 0$ $\lambda_{SD} = 0$		
Random hardware failures:	$\lambda_{DU} = 1.28E-07$ $\lambda_{SU} = 7.18E-06$		
Probability of failure on domand:	PFD _{AVG} =5.60E-04 SIL3		
	(Low Demand Mode)		
Probability of Dangerous failure on	PFH = 1.28E-07		SIL2
safety function:	(High Demand Mode)		
Hardware safety integrity compliance ^[1]	Route 1 _H		
Systematic safety integrity compliance ^[1]		Route 1s	
Systematic Capability ^[2]		SC 3	
Overall SIL-capability achieved ^[3]	SIL 3 (Low Demand)		
	SIL 2 (High Demand)		



^[1] These are new parameters used in IEC61508 Part 2 Sections 7.4.2 & 7.4.4. ^[2] This is a new measurable scale for the systematic safety integrity level; refer to IEC61508 Part 4 Section 3.5.9.

^[3] This is determined by the lowest SIL indicated by each of the parameters given above. ^[4] These figures are used only for demonstration purposes.



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(3") 1750 Series 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valve				
Safety Function:				
Architectural constraints:	Type A HFT=0 SFF 92.58%	Proof Test Interval =8760Hrs ^[4] MTTR = 8 Hrs ^[4]	SIL3	
Random hardware failures:	$\begin{array}{l} \lambda_{\text{DD}}=0\\ \lambda_{\text{DU}}=5.99\text{E-08} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \lambda_{SD}=\ 0\\ \lambda_{SU}=\ 7.49\text{E-}07 \end{array}$		
Probability of failure on demand:	PFD _{AVG} =2.63E-04 (Low Demand Mode))	SIL3	
Probability of Dangerous failure on safety function:	PFH = 5.99E-08 (High Demand Mode)	SIL3	
Hardware safety integrity compliance ^[1]		Route 1 _H		
Systematic safety integrity compliance ^[1]		Route 1s		
Systematic Capability ^[2]	SC 3			
Overall SII -capability achieved ^[3]	SIL 3 (Low Demand)			
	SIL 3 (High Demand)			
1750 Series 3" Poppet Valve Selection of Proof Time Interval versus SIL % Contribution				

^[1] These are new parameters used in IEC61508 Part 2 Sections 7.4.2 & 7.4.4. ^[2] This is a new measurable scale for the systematic safety integrity level; refer to IEC61508 Part 4 Section 3.5.9.

^[3] This is determined by the lowest SIL indicated by each of the parameters given above.

^[4] These figures are used only for demonstration purposes.



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Element Safety Function(s)¹

The safety function of the 1750 Series of 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valves is defined as:

'To ensure the valve returns to the spring extended position when pilot de-energised'

That is to say: -

- o To Open a Normally Open Poppet Valve, or
- To Close a Normally Closed Poppet Valve

The *Safe State*¹ of the *EUC*¹ is to be achieved when the product Closes a NC or Opens a NO direct acting valve.

The element safety function is intended for use in low / high or continuous demand *Mode Of Operation*¹ as indicated by the certified failure data overleaf.

The failure data above is supported by the base information given in Table 2 below.

1	Product identification:	1750 Series of 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet
•		valves as described in manufacturer's product
		catalogue
2	Functional specification:	Refer to paragraph above 'Use in safety functions'
_	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	and full specification in manufacturer's product
		catalogue.
3	Environment limits:	Temperature range:
		-20°C to +180°C (standard)
		-50°C to +90°C (low temperature version)
4	Lifetime/replacement limits:	Refer to Installation, Operation and Maintenance
		Manual
5	Proof Test requirements:	Refer to user manual
6	Maintenance requirements:	Refer to user manual
7	Diagnostic coverage:	N/A
8	Diagnostic test interval:	N/A
9	Repair constraints:	Refer to user manual
10	Evidence of similar conditions in previous	Compliance Route 2 _H (proven-in-use) not used
	use:	
11	Evidence supporting the application under	Compliance Route 2 _H (proven-in-use) not used
	different conditions of use:	
12	Evidence of period of operational use:	Compliance Route 2 _H (proven-in-use) not used
13	Statement of restrictions on functionality:	Compliance Route 2 _H (proven-in-use) not used
14	Systematic capability:	SC3
15	Systematic fault avoidance measures:	Refer to Systematic Assessment report 56A25037B
16	Systematic fault tolerance measures:	Refer to Systematic Assessment report 56A25037B
17	Validation records:	Refer to Validation Report.

Table 2: Information supporting the failure rate data

¹ Refer to IEC 61508-4 for a definition of this term



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Identification of certified equipment

The certified equipment and its safe use are defined in the manufacturer's documentation listed in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Certified drawings

1750 Series of 3/2 single pilot spring return poppet valves

Document no.	Pages	Rev	Date	Document description
	1	2	20/10/03	1/4" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET VALVE PILOT
SSBVM8/3NV				OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	26/08/04	LOW TEMPERATURE 1/4" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET
SSBVM8/3NEP ^[1]				VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	2	15/11/02	3/8" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET VALVE PILOT
SSBVM12/3NV				OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	21/12/05	LOW TEMPERATURE 3/8" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET
SSBVM12/3NEP ^[1]				VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	3	21/11/02	1/2" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET VALVE PILOT
SSBVM15/3NV				OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	26/08/04	LOW TEMPERATURE 1/2" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET
SSBVM15/3NEP ^[1]				VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	19/09/03	3/4" NPT 3-WAY POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED
SSBVM22/3NV				SPRING RETURN
	1	1	09/08/05	LOW TEMPERATURE ¾" NPT 3-WAY POPPET VALVE
SSBVM22/3N-EP				PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	07/07/03	1" NPT 3-WAY POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED
SSBVM28/3NV				SPRING RETURN
	1	1	05/06/06	LOW TEMPERATURE 1" NPT 3-WAY POPPET VALVE
SSBVM28/3N-EP				PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	2	15/11/02	1.¼" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET VALVE PILOT
SSBVM35/3NV				OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	22/03/07	LOW TEMPERATURE 1 ¹ / ₄ " NPT 3 WAY SS316
SSBVM35/3N-EP ^[1]				POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	14/10/03	1.1/2" NPT SS316 3/2 POPPET VALVE PILOT
SSBVM42/3NV				OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	12/12/05	LOW TEMPERATURE 11/2" NPT 3 WAY SS316
SSBVM42/3N-EP ^[1]				POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING RETURN
	1	1	04/04/11	2" NPT POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING
SSBVM51/3NV			ļ	RETURN
	1	5	16/12/10	3" NPT POPPET VALVE PILOT OPERATED SPRING
SSBVM76/3NV				RETURN

^[1] New addition in FSP11016/02.



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Conditions of Certification

The validity of the certified base data is conditional on the manufacturer complying with the following conditions:

- 1. The manufacturer shall analyse failure data from returned products on an on-going basis. Sira Certification Service shall be informed in the event of any indication that the actual failure rates are worse than the certified failure rates. (A process to rate the validity of field data should be used. To this end, the manufacturer should co-operate with users to operate a formal field-experience feedback programme).
- 2. Sira shall be notified in advance (with an impact analysis report) before any modifications to the certified equipment or the functional safety information in the user documentation is carried out. Sira may need to perform a re-assessment if modifications are judged to affect the product's functional safety certified herein.
- 3. On-going lifecycle activities associated with this product (e.g., modifications, corrective actions, field failure analysis) shall be subject to surveillance by Sira in accordance with 'Regulations Applicable to the Holders of Sira Certificates'.

Conditions of Safe Use

The validity of the certified base data in any specific user application is conditional on the user complying with the following conditions:

- 1. The user shall comply with the requirements given in the manufacturer's user documentation (referred to in Table 3 above) in regard to all relevant functional safety aspects such as application of use, installation, operation, maintenance, proof tests, maximum ratings, environmental conditions, repair, etc;
- 2. Selection of this equipment for use in safety functions and the installation, configuration, overall validation, maintenance and repair shall only be carried out by competent personnel, observing all the manufacturer's conditions and recommendations in the user documentation.
- 3. All information associated with any field failures of this product should be collected under a dependability management process (e.g., IEC 60300-3-2) and reported to the manufacturer.
- 4. The unit should be tested at regular intervals to identify any malfunctions; in accordance with the safety manual.

General Conditions and Notes

- 1. This certificate is based upon a functional safety assessment of the product described in Sira Test & Certification Assessment Report R56A25037A3 and any further reports referenced in that report (under previous Sira projects).
- 2. If certified product or system is found not to comply, Sira Certification Service should be notified immediately at the address shown on this certificate.
- 3. The use of this Certificate and the Sira Certification Mark that can be applied to the product or used in publicity material are subject to the 'Regulations Applicable to the Holders of Sira Certificates' and 'Supplementary Regulations Specific to Functional Safety Certification'.
- 4. This document remains the property of Sira and shall be returned when requested by the issuer.

Certificate History

Issue	Date	Project No.	Comment
05	16/02/2016	70113700	Re-issue of certificate post successful recertification.



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